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INTRODUCTION 
It would be an understatement to say that judicial sentencing 
discretion is in a state of flux; turmoil is more appropriate. In re­
cent years Congress has laid siege to the traditional sentencing dis­
cretion of United States federal district court judges. Two recent 
enactments highlight Congress' move to restrict the ability of the 
federal judiciary to tailor punishments for individual criminals. But 
the courts have reacted in this battle, which at its core is a debate 
over the proper scope of judicial sentencing discretion. In two high 
profile decisions, Blakely v. Washington l and United States v. 
Booker,2 the U.S. Supreme Court has resisted legislative action re­
* B.A., University of Denver; M.A., California State University, Los Angeles; 
J.D., magna cum laude, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to thank 
Professor Karl Shoemaker for his assistance and, of course, for helping show medieval 
law's continued relevance to modern events. I would also like to thank Bratislav 
Stankovic and Guillermo Carrillo for their helpful comments on early drafts of this 
Article. Of course, any errors that remain are mine. 
1. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
2. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
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stricting judicial sentencing discretion. Together, these events have 
sparked an important dialogue concerning the scope of federal 
judges' ability to mete out sentences. 
The most commented on congressional action was the passage 
of the Feeney Amendment.3 A number of the Feeney Amend­
ment's provisions limit judges' discretion during criminal sentencing 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Until 
Booker, the Guidelines themselves restricted judges' ability to craft 
a sentence that truly reflected the facts of each case. The debate­
less passage of the Feeney Amendment4 led to immediate cries that 
Congress was impinging on the independence of the judiciary in a 
way that was not only imprudent, but also contrary to the funda­
mental principles of the Constitution.5 As Judge Dickran Tevrizian 
recently articulated, "judicial independence is the ability of the 
courts to be free of inappropriate controls when engaging in judicial 
decision making."6 
Congress also limited judicial discretion by significantly in­
creasing the penalties for white-collar crimes-even though the 
body in charge of recommending changes in penalties had just in­
creased them following the conclusion of a comprehensive six-year 
3. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3742(g)(1» [hereinafter Feeney Amendment]. 
4. Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of 
Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (2004) 
(calling the Feeney Amendment a "drive-by rewrite of sentencing law"); Bruce Moyer, 
FBA Urges Repeal of Sentencing Restrictions, FED. LAW., Feb. 2004, at 10. See also 
David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on 
Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REv. 211, 229 (2004). 
5. See Bruce Moyer, Judges Challenge Congress on Sentencing Authority, FED. 
LAW., Oct. 2003, at 10 [hereinafter Judges Challenge Congress]. Moyer discusses the 
judicial reaction to the changes in the Guidelines and quotes one district court judge's 
reaction: 
Judge John S. Martin Jr., writing in The New York Times in June, announced 
his intention to resign from the bench and declared, "For a judge to be de­
prived of the ability to consider all of the factors that go into formulating a just 
sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been 
the hallmark of the American justice system." 
Id. See also Michael S. Gerber, A Judge's View, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 74-75. 
Despite the title of the piece, Mr. Gerber is not a judge. See The Hill, Beats and Bios, at 
http://thehill.comlthehill/exportlTheHilIIAboutimichaet.gerber.html. 
6. United States v. Mendoza, No. CR 03-730 DT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449, at 
*4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004). Mendoza is one of two cases other than Booker to 
address the constitutionality of the Feeney Amendment. In Mendoza, the court struck 
down the reporting requirements, but did uphold a number of the other provisions of 
the Amendment. See generally id. In United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. 
Ore. 2004), the court found the Guidelines, as modified by the Feeney Amendment, to 
be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Id. at 1182. 
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study.7 
Late last term the U.S. Supreme Court, amidst important deci­
sions about the Executive Branch's power8 and the Pledge of Alle­
giance,9 dropped a bombshell in the world of criminal law when it 
issued Blakely. The decision has been called "one of the most, if 
not the most, significant constitutional criminal procedure decisions 
in generations."l0 Steven L. Chanenson was correct that Blakely 
was a significant decision, but he was also correct in his prophetic 
description of what was to come: "In fact, as of this writing in early 
August 2004, it may be better to think of Blakely as casting a dark 
storm cloud over virtually all determinate sentencing guideline sys­
tems. Which guidelines get the rain and which do not remains to be 
seen."11 On January 12, 2005, after months of speculation as to the 
effect Blakely might have on the federal Guidelines, the U.S. Su­
preme Court answered that question when it issued Booker.12 
In Blakely, the Court examined Washington State's determi­
nate sentencing scheme.13 The scheme allowed judges to impose 
sentences beyond the statutory maximum for an offense if certain 
criteria were met.14 However, facts that could lead to a longer sen­
tence did not have to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I5 The Court invalidated Washington's scheme, saying that 
only on the basis of a jury's authorization may a judge impose a 
sentence beyond the sentence that was imposed by the legislature 
for that crime.I6 To do otherwise violates a defendant's right to a 
jury trial under the Sixth AmendmentP 
In Booker, the Court examined the Guidelines in light of 
Blakely.I8 In an unusual majority opinion, authored in part by Jus­
tice Stevens and in part by Justice Breyer, the Court held that while 
the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely did apply to the 
7. Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Grid & Bear It, CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 44 
[hereinafter Grid & Bear It]. 
8. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
9. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
10. Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist With their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 
(forthcoming Oct. 2004) (manuscript at 3, on file with author). 
11. Id. at 4. 
12. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
13. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2435 (2004). 
14. Id. at 2535. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 2536. See also Chanenson, supra note 10, at 1. 
17. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540. 
18. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005). 
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Guidelines, the Guidelines could be saved from nullification by sev­
ering certain mandatory provisions.19 The Court therefore upheld 
the Guidelines, but essentially de-clawed them by rendering the 
Guidelines "advisory."2o While the Guidelines remain an impor­
tant factor for judges to consider in sentencing defendants, judges 
now have a renewed level of discretion in fashioning punishments 
for federal crimes. 
Congress' actions and the Blakely and Booker decisions have 
reinvigorated the debate over the preferred scope of judicial inde­
pendence as most easily measured by discretion. The debate over 
the Feeney Amendment, and the Guidelines in general, focuses on 
the harshness and inequalities of criminal sentencing at the federal 
level. However, the debate is important for another reason: it ex­
poses the inherent tensions in the distribution and separation of 
power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government. 
As noted by Justice Breyer in Booker: "Ours, of course, is not 
the last word: The ball now lies in Congress' court. The National 
Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the sen­
tencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress 
judges best for the federal system of justice."21 
The turmoil created by Blakely, Booker, and the Feeney 
Amendment provides a perfect opportunity to step back and re­
examine judicial discretion and the mechanisms that operate to 
constrain judges' behavior. This Article is such an undertaking. 
More specifically, this Article will look at the very birth of the 
Common Law in medieval England between 1066 and 1215 for les­
sons that will help us better understand the optimal scope of judi­
cial discretion, as well as the possible implications of Congressional 
action to define sentencing discretion. 
Certain commonalities emerge when we reduce the two legal 
systems' treatment of judicial discretion to a few key principles. I 
will show that both the medieval English monarchy and our current 
democracy struggled with defining the desirable scope of judicial 
discretion. The result is that in both systems there have been spe­
cific, reactionary limitations on discretion, as well as the implemen­
tation of more structural limitations on judicial discretion. Many of 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 757, 767; United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (D. Utah 
2005) ("In light of the Supreme Court's holding [in Booker], this court must now con­
sider just how 'advisory' the Guidelines are."). 
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768. 
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the discretion-limiting structural mechanisms developed in medie­
val England between 1066 and 1215 remain an important part of 
the current U.S. federal legal system. Finally, I will show that in 
addition to having a general distrust of the judiciary, both the cur­
rent Congress and medieval English kings show similar reactions to 
legal turmoil. 
Part I provides an overview of judicial discretion under the cur­
rent U.S. federal system by looking first at the inherent structural 
limitations on judicial discretion. In some cases, structural limita­
tions operate to impact judicial discretion more than spot legisla­
tion passed by Congress.22 Part I then turns to a discussion of the 
controversy surrounding the federal sentencing guidelines. Here, I 
distill the current controversy over the Guidelines and inherent 
structural limitations down to a few key principles, and in doing so, 
afford the best opportunity to compare similarly extracted princi­
ples from medieval England's legal system. 
Part II endeavors to uncover the scope of judicial discretion in 
medieval England between 1066 and 1215.23 This Part discusses 
specific examples as a way of illustrating the broader principles and 
discretion-limiting mechanisms operating during that tumultuous 
period. 
Part III directly compares the principles that emerge from the 
previous two sections. This Article will show that despite the differ­
ences-sometimes significant-between medieval England and the 
current U.S. federal system, important and valuable similarities are 
gleaned. The similarities highlight important lessons that will in­
form the current debate over the future and nature of the Guide­
lines and the proper scope of federal judges' discretion. 
22. An analogy would be the rules in soccer and how they affect the decision­
making of the players. The rules of play, enforced by the referee, operate to restrict 
players' decision-making in an obvious way. As the referee takes action by selectively 
enforcing rules based on the particular facts of the situation, players' behavior is af­
fected. In one game a referee may not call any off-sides penalties, even though the rule 
is always there. In another game, off-sides might be strictly enforced. In contrast, there 
are "structural limitations" inherent in a soccer game. All players in a given league will 
have their decision-making equally affected by such structural limitations as the length 
and width of the field, or the height and width of the goal. In the United States federal 
system, Congress creates spot-legislation or cracks down on non-enforcement of previ­
ous legislation. This occurs against a series of structural limitations that have existed in 
our judicial system since its creation in the eighteenth century. 
23. England is the particular focus for a number of reasons. First, it is the legal 
system from whence the American legal system sprang. Second, there would be en­
tirely too much material, over too great a time, if there were not some limits. 
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I. 	 LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE 
CURRENT U.S. FEDERAL SYSTEM 
"Judicial discretion" is a buzz-phrase that defies simple defini­
tion. But to borrow an accepted characterization: judicial discre­
tion is either primary or secondary in nature.24 A judge's primary 
discretion occurs when he or she chooses from amongst a range of 
choices.25 It is in this area that "the court can do no wrong, legally 
speaking, for there is no officially right or wrong answer."26 Pri­
mary discretion can be limited in two ·ways. First, Congress can 
limit primary judicial discretion through specific enactments, which 
reduce a judge's range of choices through explicit language. As will 
be discussed below, the Feeney Amendment modifying portions of 
the Guidelines is such a limitation.27 The Guidelines themselves, 
although promulgated through a quasi-legislative Commission,28 
also embody Congress' desire to target a specific area for the reduc­
tion of judicial discretion. Another way primary discretion can be 
limited is through structural mechanisms, which act in a less obvi­
ous way to reduce the range of choices available to a judge. For 
example, the long-term trend to codify legal doctrines and the role 
of juries are structural mechanisms that operate to limit primary 
judicial discretion. 
In contrast, secondary discretion deals with the relationship be­
tween judges.29 The most not~ble limitation on this type of discre­
tion is appellate review, and it is therefore almost exclusively a 
limitation visited on trial court judges.30 This Article addresses 
both types of discretion primarily as they operate at the federal trial 
court level. 
A. Structural Limitations on Judicial Discretion in the Current 
U.S. Federal System 
A variety of structural mechanisms limit the discretion of fed­
eral trial court judges: the long-term trend to codify laws, the jury, 
24. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 637 (1971). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text. 
28. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765 (2005) ("[T]he Commission 
[does] not exercise judicial authority, but [is] more properly thought of as exercising 
some sort of legislative power ...."). 
29. Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 637-38. 
30. Id. 
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appellate review,31 and jurisdiction. 
1. Codification 
Each year Congress creates scores of new statutes. While 
sometimes the statutes merely clarify already existing statutes or 
rules, at times the statutes also take an area of law from the com­
mon law and move it into code-based law. Under a common law 
system, the judge "makes the law" and a particular legal doctrine 
can change and grow as courts interpret the law in light of the facts 
of each new case. It is possible under the U.S. federal system con­
sisting of twelve circuit courts of appeals with attendant trial courts 
(district courts) that until the highest level of appellate review, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, addresses a particular issue, twelve (or more) 
different ways of handling a legal issue might co-exist within the 
federal system. The circuit courts' respective interpretations of a 
legal doctrine might develop at disparate rates and in slightly differ­
ent directions. 
Congress sometimes steps in to reduce judicial discretion when 
a legal doctrine is slow to develop or develops in a way that draws 
the attention of the other government branches. Thus, the codifica­
tion of a particular area of law will create uniformity in federal law. 
One notable example of this is the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("FTCA").32 Tort law is traditionally one of the great common law 
areas; famous tort cases fill casebooks at most law schools. When 
the FTCA was enacted, specifically enumerated legal standards cur­
tailed federal judges' primary discretion by limiting the types and 
number of choices judges could make when hearing a tort claim. 
As Congress continues to codify legal doctrines at an ever-increas­
ing rate, it further reduces the substantive areas in which a judge 
may act with significant discretion. 
2. The Jury 
Juries are another limit on primary judicial discretion. Histori­
cally, juries operate as one of the most significant limitations on 
judicial discretion by taking fact-finding out of the hands of 
judges.33 The jury is a cornerstone of the U.S. legal system. Not 
31. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 56-58 (1995). 
32. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.c. 
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000» (authorizing common-law tort claims against the United 
States). 
33. Peterson, supra note 31, at 58. 
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only does the Seventh Amendment guarantee the right to trial by 
jury,34 but the first Congress also sought to protect the role of com­
mon law juries.35 With juries assuming that role of fact-finder, 
judges are "relegated" to making decisions about the law and legal 
standards.36 The limitation on discretion is even more pronounced 
when the presence of a jury is coupled with a cause of action codi­
fied by Congress. 
There is, however, a caveat to the proposition that juries in the 
federal system act as a significant discretion-limiting mechanism: 
juries are less prevalent today than they were in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century America.37 One must therefore be cautious not 
to overstate the jury's role in curtailing primary judicial discretion. 
Furthermore, as federal judges' caseloads have increased, it has be­
come more difficult to get a civil case scheduled for a jury trial. 
Criminal defendants are guaranteed a "speedy trial,"38 but civil 
litigants are not. As a result, many parties to civil litigation waive 
their right to a jury trial in order to expedite their claim. Even with 
the right to a speedy trial, juries do not decide the outcome in most 
criminal prosecutions.39 In criminal cases, eighty-six percent of de­
fendants plead guilty and ten percent have their cases dismissed.40 
Of the remaining four percent, juries decide only some, because de­
fendants can waive their right to a jury trial. 
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, the right to a 
trial by jury operated as a significant check on judicial discretion by 
taking away from the judge any fact-finding role. In theory, this cut 
the judiciary's scope of discretion in half. As the role of the jury 
34. u.S. CONST. amend. VII. This amendment provides that 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than accord­
ing to the rules of the common law. 
Id. 
35. Peterson, supra note 31, at 59 ("The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly limited 
equity jurisdiction ... so as to preserve a common law right to a jury trial."). 
36. I use "relegated" because, in theory, this is still a significant discretionary role. 
37. In fact, they are becoming rarer. Gina Holland, Sharp Decline in Jury Trials 
Poses Dilemma for Lawyers, ALBANY DEMOCRAT-HERALD, Aug. 7, 2004, available at 
http://democratherald.com!artic1es/2004/08/08/news/nationlnat.13.txt. 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
39. Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 n.82 (2004) ("[I]n 2003, only 4 percent of defendants in federal 
criminal cases went to trial ....") (citation omitted). 
40. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, tbl. 3.5 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf. 
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diminishes, it is no longer clear how much primary judicial discre­
tion is limited as a result. 
3. Appellate Review 
The appellate process operates as a check on judicial discretion 
by subjecting trial courts to review. In the United States federal 
judicial system, either party has the right to appeal a trial court's 
ruling or decision to the federal court of appeals. In turn, a party 
can request review by the U.S. Supreme Court.41 
Within the check of appellate review there is another mecha­
nism operating to limit (or expand) judicial discretion: the standard 
of review under which the appellate court examines a judge's ruling 
at the trial court leve1.42 As the standard of review becomes more 
deferential ("abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous"), judges 
are said to have more discretion, because they know it is unlikely an 
appellate court will overturn their rulings. A less deferential stan­
dard occurs when a ruling is reviewed de novo by an appellate 
court. Under de novo review, a trial court effectively has very little 
secondary discretion because, on review, the appellate court will 
step in the place of a trial court and look at an issue anew. 
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court hears very few cases, the 
abstract legal principles it announces operate, along with the doc­
trine of stare decisis ,43 as a check on district court and court of ap­
peals judges alike. When the Framers crafted the Constitution, and 
Congress later added courts,44 there was a conscious attempt to 
limit the amount of discretion or power that might fall in the hands 
of any single individual. That fear extended to the judiciary. 
Therefore, appellate review became the ultimate check on individ­
ual trial judges' discretion. Justice Jackson best summed up the im­
portance of appellate review: "We [the U.S. Supreme Court] are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be­
41. However, because the U.S. Supreme Court grants petitions for review so in­
frequently, it is largely the twelve courts of appeals that act as limitations on judges' 
secondary discretion. 
42. "Standard of Review" is the lens through which an appellate court looks at 
the decision and reasoning of the court below. It is, therefore, a very powerful mecha­
nism for determining the outcome of a case once it has been appealed. 
43. Stare decisis is defined as: "The doctrine of precedent, under which it is nec­
essary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in 
litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999). 
44. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1 (noting "such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish"). 
10 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1 
cause we are final."45 The design of the federal courts acts as a 
structural mechanism to limit the amount of secondary, as well as 
primary, federal judicial discretion. 
4. Jurisdiction 
The most significant check on federal judicial discretion 
emerges from the Constitution and cases such as Erie v. 
Tompkins.46 While Chief Justice John Marshall may have suc­
ceeded in one of the great power grabs in U.S. history in Marbury v. 
Madison,47 the Constitution still significantly constrains primary 
judicial discretion by limiting judicial power to "cases or 
controversies."48 
Additionally, Congress has created a number of specialty 
courts, such as the Court of Federal Claims, that remove entire ar­
eas of law from the hands of a large portion of the federal judiciary. 
The House of Representatives passage of The Marriage Protection 
Act provides a perfect example.49 This bill would remove questions 
regarding gay marriage and questions arising from the Defense of 
Marriage Act from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.50 While 
the constitutionality of this bill is questionable, it nevertheless illus­
trates that Congress can, and does, attempt to impact judicial dis­
cretion by tinkering with the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
In turn, each of the above-mentioned changes limits judges' 
primary or secondary discretion. 
5. Grants of Discretion 
The U.S. federal system is unique however, not because of its 
structural limitations on judicial discretion, but rather because of 
the mechanisms that operate to ensure it. The framers of the U.S. 
Constitution wanted an independent federal judiciary (their con­
cerns about consolidation of power notwithstanding).51 In fact, the 
federal judiciary is subject to less external checks than any other 
45. Peterson, supra note 31, at 56 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 
(1953), overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). 
46. 304 U.S. 64 (1938), superceded by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2004). 
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] ... to Controversies."). 
49. Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313EH, 108th Congo (2004). It is, of course, 
extremely unlikely that such a bill would ever pass the Senate. 
50. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
51. Peterson, supra note 31, at 45. 
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branch of the government.52 
Clauses contained in Article III of the United States Constitu­
tion guarantee tenure during good behavior53 and protect federal 
judges' salaries from being reduced during their time on the 
bench.54 Federal district and appellate court judges are appointed 
for life terms, thereby acting as another important mechanism in 
ensuring judicial discretion.55 Federal trial court judges also retain 
significant discretion in pre-trial matters.56 The Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the jury, during trial, significantly limit discretion, 
whereas prior to trial, judges have significant latitude in handling 
parties. This is especially true in civil trials, as most pre-trial deci­
sions are not subject to judicial review by federal appellate courtsY 
Judges also wield powerful discretion in fashioning settlements in 
the ever-growing field of class action and mass-tort lawsuits.58 
From this brief and non-exhaustive overview of judicial discre­
tion in the U.S. federal system, several principles emerge. First, 
U.S. federal trial judges still retain a fair amount of both primary 
and secondary judicial discretion in a number of areas of law and 
trial procedure. Second, Congress has acted, and will continue to 
act, to limit primary judicial discretion where it can, often as knee­
jerk reactions to public or political outcry. Finally, significant struc­
tural mechanisms operate to limit the exercise of judicial discretion. 
As will be further discussed below, many of the limitations dis­
cussed in this Part are not new, and in fact remain important for 
many of the same reasons that motivated their development in me­
dieval England. 
52. Id. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges ... shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour. "). 
54. Id. ("[CJompensation ... shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office. "). 
55. Counter-acting against lifetime appointment is the increased politization of 
the confirmation process. The Senate will confirm only those judges whom the Execu­
tive Branch truly supports. As a result, those judges may feel beholden to an Adminis­
tration in a way they would not have been when just legal qualifications determined 
whether someone was confirmed. 
56. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587-93 (2003). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1601-04. 
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B. 	 Recent Developments Concerning the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines 
1. 	 The Feeney59 Amendment and the Guidelines 
Congress' passage of the Feeney Amendment reinvigorated 
the debate over how much discretion federal judges should have, 
particularly in those areas traditionally the sole province of the judi­
ciary, such as criminal sentencing. The Feeney Amendment, which 
was tacked on without debate to the "Amber Alert" measure in a 
last minute move was an overt move by Congress to restrict judicial 
discretion.60 
The amendment effectively overruled a 1996 United States Su­
preme Court case, Koon v. United States,61 by forbidding judges 
from "departing downward"62 from the federal sentencing Guide­
lines.63 Most ironic about the cries that judicial discretion was out 
of control, as evidenced by the number of downward departures, 
59. The author of the bill was freshman Florida Congressman Tom Feeney. 
Feeney was recently quoted as saying about himself: "I am here to say that I think Tom 
Feeney knows more about the Constitution than some of our federal judges." Scott 
Maxwell, Hanging with the Chief Justice, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2004, at B2. 
Feeney is also currently pushing the "Reaffirmation of American Independence 
Resolution" which would forbid judges from relying on foreign case law when deciding 
cases. Id. Presumably, this would also undermine Justice Scalia's use of English 
Common Law precedent in both Blakely and Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 
1355-56 (2004) (tracing the historical roots of the right to confront your accuser in his 
reinvigoration of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause). 
60. Bruce Moyer, New Sentencing Law Narrows Judicial Discretion, FED. LAW., 
May 2003, at 12 [hereinafter New Sentencing Law]. The Amber Alert legislation is an 
anti-child pornography and abduction measure. For an excellent history of the Amend­
ment and the Amber Alert legislation as recounted in the context of a legal case, see 
United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322 (D. Utah 2003) (finding that the 
Amendment allows for discretion in some areas, but that in certain areas judges are 
completely restrained). 
61. 	 New Sentencing Law, supra note 60, at 12; see also Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (judge's downward departure was reviewed under an "abuse of dis­
cretion" standard and it was appropriate to consider reasons not contemplated by the 
Guidelines when deciding whether to allow a downward departure). 
62. "Departing downward" refers to the practice by federal judges of finding this 
correct square on the sentencing grid, determining the mandated sentence-say, for 
example, twenty months-but then disregarding that specifically mandated term and 
giving something lower-say, nineteen months. The downward departure could be for 
any number of reasons, including: significant aid to officials in locating other criminals, 
the defendant's small role in the crime, his or her willingness to plea bargain, or, a 
feeling by the judge that the person would not be better served from the mandatory 
time in custody. Of course, judges could depart upwards as well, but this was a far less 
common occurrence since it raised Eighth Amendment and due process issues. 
63. New Sentencing Law, supra note 60, at 12. While the amendment was origi­
nally written to apply to all criminal sentencing, it was subsequently limited to just ap­
ply to child pornography and abduction cases. Id. 
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was the fact that federal prosecutors themselves account for more 
than two-thirds of all requested and granted departures.64 The 
amendment was a direct reaction to a federal district court judge's 
high-profile comments challenging the efficacy of the Guidelines as 
they applied to crack cocaine convictions.65 
The Guidelines have been controversial since their creation as 
part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA").66 With the 
SRA, Congress created a uniform system with the stated goal of 
consistency in federal criminal sentencing.67 The SRA established 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission")68 and tasked it 
with creating a set of guidelines or grid that would circumscribe the 
length of sentence for those convicted of a federal crime.69 The 
Guidelines allowed for either upward or downward "departure" if 
the facts of a particular case call for it. Even with discretionary 
wiggle room for judges, this system was significantly different than 
the previous sentencing practice, where judges were given vast lee­
way in determining the length of sentences.70 
64. Mark Allenbaugh, Fighting the Feeney Fear Factor: The Federal Courts Strike 
Back, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 46 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS­
SION, 108TH CONG., DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 68 (Comm. Print 2003». 
65. Douglas A. Kelley, Federal Judge Draws Congressional Ire, BENCH & B. 
MINN., July 2003, at 22 (discussing the comments by Chief Judge James Rosenbaum 
when he testified before the House Judiciary Committee in 2002). 
66. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, PUb. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586,3591-3596, and 28 
U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (1994». 
67. Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, You Be The Judge: The Success of Fifteen 
Years of Sentencing Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 5, 5 (2003). 
68. The Commission is technically legislative, but it was created within the Judi­
cial Branch. However, the Feeney Amendment's removal of judges from the Commis­
sion calls into serious question this distinction. Chanenson, supra note 10, at 3. 
As the central premise of his forthcoming article, Chanenson suggests that by re­
moving federal judges from the Commission, Congress inadvertently removed the only 
meaningful distinction between the now-invalid Washington sentencing scheme, and the 
Guidelines. Id. This is an interesting pOint, and it will be interesting to see what ulti­
mately happens, but I think perhaps it is a distinction without a difference. Whether or 
not the actual sentences drawn on the grid were conjured up by a panel-authorized by 
Congress-or Congress itself, the problem remains the same: should judges be allowed 
to exceed the relevant statutory maximum for a crime without authorization from a 
jury? 
69. See id.; Zlotnick, supra note 4, at 215-25. 
70. See Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge's Perspec­
tive-2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 11,12-14 (2003). Specifically: 
The statute defining a particular crime prescribed the maximum, but not any 
minimum, sentence. Before sentencing, the court's probation officer inter­
viewed the defendant and independently investigated his or her personal his­
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By themselves, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when 
mandatory pre-Booker, operated as a significant limitation on pri­
mary judicial discretion by limiting judges to a range of possible 
sentences, rather than just setting a maximum penalty.71 The Fee­
ney Amendment further restricted this already limited primary dis­
cretion even further by restricting the sentences judges can give in 
certain types of cases.72 As is discussed below, the mandatory pro­
visions of the Guidelines were severed in Booker in order to save 
them from being unconstitutional in light of Blakely and Apprendi 
v. New Jersey.73 
The Feeney Amendment also attempted to limit a judge's sec­
ondary discretion by altering the standard of review for criminal 
sentences from "abuse of discretion" to "de novo."74 This provision 
was severed from the Guidelines in Justice Breyer's portion of the 
majority opinion in Booker.75 
A provision of the Feeney Amendment that did survive 
Booker allows for tracking of an individual judge's sentencing prac­
tices through the issuance of a subpoena.76 Congress makes the de­
cision of whom to track on a judge-by-judge basis.77 This 
tory, education, work experience, prospects, physical and mental condition, 
and criminal record if there was one. From this information, the probation 
officer prepared a pre-sentence report. The report also included whatever in­
formation the probation officer could gather informally about the sentences 
actually imposed for similar crimes by other judges on the same court and 
nationwide. The sentencing itself was a serious and solemn ceremony. In a 
procedure known as allocution, defense counsel stated his client's case for le­
niency, including family background, family and community support, educa­
tion or lack of it, and good works such as military service. The prosecution 
sometimes, but not always, responded with its perspective on the crime and its 
significance. Eyeball-to-eyeball with the judge, the defendant stood and 
spoke. Then the judge, exercising his constitutional judicial power, imposed a 
sentence. 
[d. at 14. 
71. The guidelines were originally suggested by a federal judge, but are now an 
example of unintended consequences. While Judge Frankel, who originally suggested 
them, saw them as a stop-gap measure that would eventually be replaced by appellate 
decisions (including the U.S. Supreme Court), the exact opposite has happened. The 
guidelines have become more entrenched. Id. at 15. 
72. Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress' 
Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of Reform, CHAM­
PION, June 2003, at 8 [hereinafter Who's Afraid]. 
73. 530 U.S. 466 (2000), cited in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 763-65 
(2005). 
74. Who's Afraid, supra note 72, at 11; Bibas, supra note 4, at 296. 
75. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 763-65. 
76. Bibas, supra note 4, at 308 n.39. 
77. Id. 
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provision's potential for limiting primary discretion has not gone 
unnoticed, as evidenced by Chief Justice William Rehnquist's com­
ments on the issue: "There can ... be no doubt that the subject 
matter of the questions, and whether they target the judicial deci­
sions of individual federal judges, could amount to an unwarranted 
and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the per­
formance of their judicial duties."78 Tracking by subpoena allows 
Congress to stand just behind a judge, looking over his or her shoul­
der and acting as a constant reminder of its presence. This has not 
gone unnoticed by members of the federal judiciary.79 
In another structural change, the Feeney Amendment changes 
the make-up of the Commission so as to no longer require that any 
of its members be federal judges-a move in stark contrast to tradi­
tional makeup of the Commission, as well as the previously unfet­
tered discretion federal judges wielded in criminal sentencing.80 A 
re-constituted Commission without any federal district court judges 
could likely end up limiting judges' primary and secondary 
discretion. 
2. Sentences for White-Collar Crime 
Although the Feeney Amendment garnered the most attention 
for its discretion limiting nature, it was not the only congressional 
action in 2003 that restrained the sentencing discretion of the fed­
eral judiciary. In November 2003, a new set of amendments to the 
Guidelines was put in place; these amendments greatly increase the 
penalties for white-collar crimes such as fraud and theft.81 These 
amendments are a damaging attack on judicial discretion. It is not 
apparent that Booker will have any effect on these amendments to 
the Guidelines. 
Normally, the Commission is tasked with making recommen­
dations for changes in the sentencing grid; with respect to white­
collar crimes, it did just that.82 In the fall of 2002, the Commission 
completed a six-year study and concluded that changes needed to 
78. Judges Challenge Congress, supra note 5, at 10. 
79. United States v. Kim, 313 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Mark H. 
Allenbaugh, Heatwole: A Test Case for Sentencing Sanity, 18 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (2004); 
but see Gerber, supra note 5, at 74-75. 
80. See generally United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Ore. 2004) 
(finding that the Feeney Amendment's changes to the Commission violated the Separa­
tion of Powers Doctrine). 
81. Grid & Bear It, supra note 7, at 44. 
82. Id. 
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be made to the grid by enhancing penalties for certain white-collar 
crimes.83 However, just seven months after the study and recom­
mendations, Congress, reacting to the Enron and World Com scan­
dals, suggested, without ever studying the issue, that even harsher 
penalties than the Commission's six-year study suggested were nec­
essary.84 This has led to outlandish results already.85 
While the Commission could have ignored the recommenda­
tions, it bent under significant political pressure and adopted 
them.86 As one commentator noted, "[a]s an independent agency 
of the Judiciary Branch . . . the Commission must do more than 
reflexively adopt the recommendations of the Executive and Legis­
lative Branches. "87 If Congress continues to flex its muscle in this 
knee-jerk manner, structural mechanisms that protect judicial dis­
cretion will be eroded. 
The recent changes to the Guidelines highlight Congress' de­
sire to reign in the federal judiciary by reducing the federal judges' 
primary discretion, and to a lesser extent, secondary discretion. 
Congressional action in response to the crisis de jure requires atten­
tion, but it is important to note that identifying inherent structural 
limitations is just as critical for understanding the scope of judicial 
discretion. Even though structural limitations do not draw as much 
attention, they often operate to do more to limit judicial discretion 
than congressional reactions.88 
Congress' desire to limit judicial discretion is not new. The 
roots of these structural limitations and the strong desire to take 
specific action to limit judicial discretion can be traced to medieval 
England. Therefore, to truly understand the impact of Congress' 
current actions and reactions, we must travel back in time to the 
birth of the Common Law. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 44-45; Thomas Lee Hazon, Securities Law for Non-Securities Lawyers: 
Overview of Federal Securities Law, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, at 6 (2004) ("The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the Congressional reaction (overreaction?) to scandals 
such as Enron and Worldcom."). 
85. John Gibeaut, Do the Crime, Serve More Time, 3 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 13 
(2004) (discussing the twenty-four year and four month sentence for a young mid-level 
accountant at Dynegy, Inc. who was described as "essentially nobody" in a stock fraud 
scandal). 
86. Grid & Bear It, supra note 7, at 45. 
87. [d. 
88. Of course, a prolonged period of constant enactments by Congress would 
have a cumulative effect akin to a structural mechanism, but that discussion is beyond 
the limited scope of this Article. 
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3. Blakely v. Washington 
The "effect" of today's decision will be greater judicial discretion 
and less uniformity in sentencing.89-Justice O'Connor 
Justice O'Connor simply assumes that the net effect will favor 
judges, but she has no empirical basis for that prediction.90-Jus­
tice Scalia 
Regardless of which Justice is ultimately proven correct, the 
immediate "effect" is clear: sentencing discretion is a hot topic. In 
fact, the decision has spawned web logs ("blogs") and whole 
webpages devoted to Blakely and sentencing resources.91 
While Blakely was confined to examination of Washington 
State's determinate sentencing scheme, the implications of Blakely 
were immediately apparent: what effect would Blakely have on 
whether the Guidelines were valid?92 The U.S. Supreme Court 
quickly granted certiorari in two of the early cases that invalidated 
either part, or all, of the Guidelines as they pertain to factors that 
increase sentences without authorization from a jury.93 
Ralph Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping.94 The statutory maxi­
mum for the crime was fifty-three months.95 However, the judge 
felt Blakely had displayed "deliberate cruelty" and imposed a 
89. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissent­
ing). According to Justice O'Connor: 
Sentencing judges ... had virtually unfettered discretion to sentence defend­
ants to prison terms falling anywhere within the statutory range . . . . This 
system of unguided discretion inevitably resulted in severe disparities in 
sentences received and served by defendants committing the same offense and 
having similar criminal histories. 
Id. at 2544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 2541. 
91. The single best resource for Blakely information has to be the blog Sentencing 
Law and Policy, operated by Ohio State University law professor Douglas A. Berman, 
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com; see also First District Appellate Project, 
Blakely v. Washington Resources, available at http://www.fdap.orglblakely.html. 
92. Dale Emch, Federal Sentence Guidelines Are Up in Air after Decisions, To­
LEDO BLADE, July 18, 2004; Dan Laidman, O'Connor Criticizes Court Decision, MONT­
GOMERY HERALD, July 23, 2004 (O'Connor called the Blakely decision a "number 10 
earthquake"); David Savage, Thousands of Cases in Doubt After Decision on Sentenc­
ing, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2004; Eric Weslander, Congress May Look to Kansas for Sen­
tencing Guidance, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, July 18, 2004. 
93. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 
73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. July 21, 2004) (No. 04-104); United States v. Fanfan, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 18593 (D. Me. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. July 21, 
2004) (No. 04-105). 
94. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2533. 
95. Id. at 2535. 
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ninety-month sentence.96 Even though the judge was allowed to do 
this under Washington law, the Court invalidated the procedure. 
The Court in Blakely said that Washington's determinate sen­
tencing schemes were the "statutory maximums" that a judge could 
not exceed without a jury's authorization.97 It does not matter that 
it was the legislature that granted the judge the right to ratchet-up 
the penalty; a jury must establish all factors that determine the sen­
tence for a criminal defendant.98 
4. United States v. Booker 
In Booker, the Court picked up where it left off in Blakely. 
The majority opinion in Booker is divided into two parts. The first 
portion, which upholds Apprendi99 and applies Blakely'S interpreta­
tion of the Sixth Amendment to the Guidelines, is authored by Jus­
tice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
Ginsberg. lOo The second portion of the majority opinion is au­
thored by Justice Breyer and is joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg. This portion 
"saves" the Guidelines from being unconstitutional by severing the 
mandatory portions of the Guidelines and the Feeney Amend­
ment.I01 Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas all issued solo opin­
ions dissenting in part, while Justice Stevens also authored a partial 
dissent that Justices Scalia and Souter joined.102 
The first portion of the Booker opinion was not surprising in 
light of Apprendi and Blakely. As Justice Stevens noted: 
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact 
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts estab­
lished by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by 
the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 103 
Because the Guidelines required federal judges to move around 
(and up) on the sentencing grid based on facts not proved to a jury, 
the Guidelines were unconstitutional. If Justice Steven's portion of 
96. Id. 
97. Chanenson, supra note 10, at 3-4. 
98. Id. at 2. 
99. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
100. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 745 (2005). 
101. [d. at 756. 
102. See generally id. at 738. 
103. Id. at 756. 
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the majority opinion were the end of the analysis, the Guidelines 
would fall. 
However, the second portion of the majority opinion severs the 
mandatory provisions of the Guidelines in order to save the whole 
sentencing scheme from being declared unconstitutional.104 This is 
the portion of the opinion that renders the previously mandatory 
Guidelines advisory.105 It is this second portion of the opinion that 
will no doubt garner the most attention from commentators and, 
more importantly, Congress. 
Justice Breyer's portion of the majority opinion in Booker ex­
amines two primary options for "saving" the Guidelines from being 
declared unconstitutional. One option, which Justices Stevens, Sou­
ter, and Scalia advocate in a partial dissent, would engraft a Sixth 
Amendment jury trial requirement onto the Guidelines.106 Justice 
Breyer's majority rejects this: "The addition would change the 
Guidelines by preventing the sentencing court from increasing a 
sentence on the basis of a fact that the jury did not find (or that the 
offender did not admit)."107 
Instead, the Court adopted the second option which, through 
severance of the offending provisions, "make[s] the Guidelines sys­
tem advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the 
sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct-a connection 
important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress 
intended its Guidelines system to achieve."lo8 
The majority justified the severance of the mandatory provi­
sions of the Guidelines by noting that 
We do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote the Sentencing 
Act, intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system 
.... But, we repeat, given today's constitutional holding, that is 
not a choice that remains open. Hence, we have examined the 
statute in depth to determine Congress' likely intent in light of 
today's holding.109 
Justice Scalia responded: "The majority's remedial choice is 
thus wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a stat­
utory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, [the 
104. Id. 
105. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (D. Utah 2005). 
106. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. 
107. Id. 
108. [d. 
109. Id. at 767-68. 
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majority] discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sen­
tencing."llo Justice Scalia's point is well-taken, because by choos­
ing to render the Guidelines advisory, the majority may have taken 
a path that is sure to bring congressional reaction. Had the major­
ity chosen to engraft the Sixth Amendment jury trial protections 
onto the Guidelines, the ability of Congress to react may have been 
significantly reduced. 
A federal jury in Wisconsin convicted Freddie Booker of pos­
sessing 92.5 grams of crack cocaine.111 This offense carried a prison 
term of ten years to life.n2 Under the Guidelines, Booker's crimi­
nal history and the jury's finding required the district court judge to 
select a "base" sentence between 210 months and 262 months.113 
However, in post-trial sentencing the district court judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an additional 
566 grams of crack cocaine and also obstructed justice.114 These 
findings moved Booker's sentencing range under the Guidelines 
upward to 360 months to life.1l5 As the Court noted, this increased 
Booker's maximum exposure under the Guidelines beyond twenty­
one years, ten months to the thirty-year sentence that the district 
court judge ultimately imposed.116 In light of the Court's first por­
tion of the majority opinion applying Apprendi and the Sixth 
Amendment analysis of Blakely to the Guidelines, the Court af­
firmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in Booker.1l7 
Federal criminal defendants and their attorneys should under­
standably be pleased with Booker if they thought the Guidelines' 
sentences were too harsh and if they thought that judges might 
show them some mercy with their new-found sentencing discretion. 
110. Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 745. Booker is a consolidated appeal with United States v. Fanfan. 
Duncan Fanfan was similarly convicted of drug offenses. However, the district court in 
Fanfan opted not to follow those portions of the Guidelines that implicated Sixth 
Amendment concerns, instead sentencing the defendant "based solely upon the guilty 
verdict" and not the sentence-enhancement factors. Id. at 747. In Booker, the U.S. 
Court of Appeais for the Seventh Circuit invalidated the portion of the sentence that 
was contrary to the Court's holding in Apprendi. Id. at 745. In Fanfan, the case by­
passed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit when the Court granted the 
government's writ of certiorari. Id. at 747. 





117. Id. at 769. However, the Court vacated the sentence in Fanfan and re­
manded for potential re-sentencing in light of the Booker opinion. Id. 
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Any rejoicing, however, may be premature. For example, at least 
one district court has considered the advisory nature of the Guide­
lines and imposed a sentence with its newfound discretion that was 
within the range the Guidelines mandated.118 
The other reason celebration may be premature is that Booker 
is sure to provoke a response from Congress. After all, in restoring 
some sense of judicial discretion to federal sentencing, Justice 
Breyer's portion of the majority opinion has effectively neutered 
the Guidelines. All that is yet to be determined is the measure of 
Congress' response. But irrespective of the form of the inevitable 
reaction, for the purpose of this Article, the point is simple: before 
Congress119 rushes to react to a functional invalidation of the fed­
eral determinate sentencing scheme, or before Congress acts to 
shore up the still-valid portions of the Guidelines, it is important to 
think about the relevant historical roots of judicial discretion. It is 
likewise equally important to look back and examine the impact of 
measures designed to limit judicial discretion. Only through revisit­
ing the past will Congress be able to craft a constitutional set of 
Guidelines that properly balance its desires with the valuable sen­
tencing experience many federal judges bring to the process. 
II. JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 
Given England's connection to the U.S., it is logical to limit the 
scope of this inquiry to medieval England. However, picking a spe­
cific period is the more difficult task. The simplest comparison 
would be to pick the time period after which the English common 
law legal system was firmly established, between the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries. However, I have chosen the period between 
the invasion by Norman Duke William in 1066 and the offering of 
the Magna Carta in 1215 as the most informative for understanding 
the implications of Congress' current actions. 
The years immediately following the Norman Conquest were a 
tumultuous period that turned out to be the inception of what we 
recognize as the modern Anglo-American legal tradition. There 
were struggles between competing traditions and customs (Norman 
vs. English; secular vs. ecclesiastical; centralized vs. local), the 
118. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (imposing a 
188 month sentence in light of Booker when the Guidelines would have imposed a 
sentence of no less than 188 months). 
119. None of the principles in this Article apply exclusively to federal judicial 
discretion. In fact, a state like Washington, faced with a now-invalid determinate sen­
tencing scheme, would do well to heed the historical foundation of judicial discretion. 
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emergence of a professional judicial core, and there was an explo­
sion in the volume of litigation.120 The inherent tensions in these 
evolutionary conflicts help to illustrate under what circumstances, 
through what mechanisms, and why sovereigns have sought to limit 
or expand judicial discretion. 
To understand an English judge's role during this period, and 
thereby truly grasp the level of primary or secondary discretion121 
he122 mayor may not have had, it is probably best to sketch briefly 
the development of the English legal system post-Norman Con­
quest to 1215.123 
A. 	 Overview of the Development of the Medieval English Legal 
System: 1066-1215 
1. English Law 
Regardless of where one starts one's examination of the En­
glish legal system, it is impossible not to mention the influence of 
the Norman Conquest. It has been said that the "[c]onquest is a 
catastrophe which determines the whole future history of English 
law."124 The Normans "brought a taste for strong government and 
a flair for administration,"125 and it was this flair that eventually 
enabled judges (or others) to rule on behalf of the king without him 
being physically present.126 The Normans (King William specifi­
cally), brought an aptitude for administration, but chose to leave 
English law largely in place, with some structural revisions, rather 
than impose what remained of Norman laws.127 With important ad­
120. 	 See infra Part II.A. 
121. I will continue to use the same general definitions of primary and secondary 
discretion discussed above, although discretionary limits are more explicitly discussed 
later in the text. See infra Part II.B. 
122. If I use a personal pronoun when referring to judges in Part II, I will use 
"he" because judges in medieval Europe were male. 
123. There are whole books written on English history and English law during 
this period. I will limit my discussion to this period's relevant highlights for understand­
ing the development or changes in judicial discretion. 
124. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HIS­
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 79 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1895). 
125. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6 (But­
terworths Lexis Nexis 2002) (1971). But see R.c. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE 
ENGLISH COMMON LAW 28 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1973) (noting that the transi­
tion was not solely genius, but a large degree of luck as well). 
126. 	 BAKER, supra note 125, at 12. 
127. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 79 (the decision not to impose 
Norman law on the English may ultimately have saved English law from being swal­
lowed by the Roman legal renaissance that was just around the comer). See also MAR­
TIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 60 (1981). 
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ministrative contributions came increased judicial efficiency.128 The 
royal courts became a court of justice for all, so it became necessary 
to alter the structure of the courts by simultaneously centralizing 
and specializing them.129 
It is not entirely obvious what exactly constituted the "law of 
England" in the years immediately following the Conquest. For 
one thing, the laws and administration of justice in England en­
dured several encounters with competing legal systems during the 
late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.130 
Further, the Normans did not bring a code with them, for there 
was no written Norman code.131 Even an early book credited as 
being the laws of King William granted to the English is merely a 
hodgepodge of different legal systems. The Leis Williame is part 
Norman-interpretive understanding of old English law, part transla­
tion of parts of Cnut's code, all with a sprinkling of "articles which 
betray the influence of Roman law."132 In the end, a person might 
draw on the old English dooms, the Lex Salica (canonical law), or 
the re-emerging Roman law.133 Add to this French-speaking nobil­
ity trying to rule an English population used to Wessex law, Mer­
cian Law, or Danelaw, and it made for quite a confusing state of 
affairs. From a legal-consistency perspective, "the country was be­
coming covered with small courts" with one rising over another fur­
ther fractionalizing legal customs.134 It was a constant challenge to 
figure out which court had jurisdiction over what causes of actions. 
2. The King's Central Courts 
From the chaos emerged the future of English law as we now 
know it, and as Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William 
128. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 153. 
129. Id. at 153. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 19. 
130. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 80-87. One of the conflicts was 
for linguistic supremacy, with French emerging as the main victor. French is the "main 
victor" for a couple of reasons. First, there were very few Frenchmen actually in En­
gland after the Norman Conquest, so the fact that it gained a foothold within the law is 
no small feat. Second, law to this day is stamped with French words, such as tort and 
others. As Pollock and Maitland point out, the English that French eventually yielded 
to was "an English in which every cardinal word was of French origin." Id. at 85. The 
linguistic battle was important because "language is no mere instrument which we can 
control at will; it controls us." Id. at 87. 
131. Id. at 79. 
132. Id. at 102. It is also likely the volume was not published until well after 
William's death. 
133. Id. at 105. 
134. Id. at 106. 
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Maitland note, it was the king's court.135 At the time, the king's 
court was a flexible, equity court that met hardly three times a year, 
yet was centralized, with "the king's justice ... done under his own 
eye. "136 In that respect, it is important to remember that the 
"judges were not set so clearly apart from the executive as in mod­
ern times. "137 
The central court of the king's justice (capitalis curia Regis) 
was comprised of sworn, permanent justices who served the king 
and were experts in the administration of justice.138 When the king 
was absent, certain cases or complaints would be heard by another 
group of judges of the royal court who sat at Westminster.139 Dur­
ing the Westminster sessions, the king would often be absent, and 
so these sessions also became quite popular. In fact, when the bar­
ons "extorted"140 the Magna Carta from King John, one of the pro­
visions they demanded provided for a permanent court of common 
pleas at Westminster, so cases could be heard out of earshot of the 
king.141 With this development the "personal justice of the king 
[became] the institutional justice of the king's court. "142 
The king had significant control over judges in his courts. In 
1203, the king directed judges to act merely as "arbitrators" and to 
"make peace between the parties."143 On other occasions the court 
might feel a matter was beyond its competence.144 Since the king 
was seen as the wellspring of law, difficult points were sometimes 
referred to the judgment of the king.145 This combination of judi­
cial deference and kingly decrees limited judges' primary discretion. 
Although substantial, the king's control over the justices was 
not absolute. During the king's absence, the justices would often 
dispense judgments in his name. Normally, the king might demand 
that he be present for the hearing of certain cases. For example, in 
1201, the king found a matter so important as to demand that its 
135. Id. at 107. The two courts closely associated with the central king's courts 
were the "King's Court" and the "Common Court." 
136. Id. at 107-09. 
137. SIR CYRIL FLOWER, INTRODUCTION TO TIiE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230 
A.D. 15 (Selden Society 1944). 
138. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 154-55. 
139. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 74. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 75. 
143. FLOWER, supra note 137, at 15. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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resolution be postponed until his return to England.146 Despite 
such instructions, the king's demands were not always obeyed. On 
several occasions in 1205 and 1206, the Curia Regis Rolls reveal that 
the king's court proceeded on its own, despite assizes mandating 
that a case should be delayed or postponed.147 Even so, the in­
stances where the king's judges exhibited independence from de­
crees were few in comparison to acts of obedience.148 
3. Other Royal Courts 
An elaborate system of royal courts developed in the two hun­
dred years following the Conquest. These courts operated "be­
neath" the central King's Court, but were, nevertheless, vital for the 
administration of justice in England and ultimately responsible to 
the king. In addition to the King's Court and Common Court, there 
were four other "central" courts: The Exchequer (dealt primarily 
with money issues); Courts of the Forest (dealt with the king's for­
ests); Courts of the Jews (dealt with money-lending issues); and the 
Courts of the Palace (handled cases arising on the grounds of the 
king's palace at Westminster).149 Each of these courts had special­
ized jurisdiction over a geographical area or subject matter. These 
specialized courts allowed the king to solidify his grasp on an area 
of law, while not necessarily running it through the two main royal 
courts. 
For the widespread administration of the king's justice, how­
ever, one court played a very important role. The Court of the Jus­
tices in Eyre was the roaming court that served as the link between 
central and local jurisdictions.15o Henry I was the first to take full 
advantage of these justices by seating a more permanent tribunal 
made up of trusted barons and clerks who were occasionally sent 
out into "the counties to hear the pleas of the crown."151 "Instead 
of long-term delegation of royal authority to a lord permanently 
connected to a single territory, there would be a temporary delega­
tion to a king's officer," who occasionally traveled out on his 
"eyre," where upon returning his authority was surrendered back to 
146. Id. at 33. Often the "matter of importance" involved either important tracts 
of land or individuals closely associated with the king. 
147. Id. at 34. 
148. Id. at 35. 
149. Id. at 43-53. 
150. Id. at 53. 
151. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 109. 
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the king.152 The use of the eyre was at once an "administrative so­
lution to an administrative problem,"153 while at the same time it 
limited the power and discretion of local judges.t54 
The rise of the courts of eyre was, in part, a response to the 
problem that the local courts continued to splinter because "[a]s the 
barons became more powerful, they tended to garner the position 
of sheriff in their locale for themselves or their friends."155 The 
sheriffs then ceased transmitting royal power into the country­
side.156 Justice in the County Court may have been quicker than 
other royal courts, but hardly anyone would contend that it was 
impartial.157 The problem of impartiality became less of an issue as 
royal control was centralized. In fact, some enquiries were dele­
gated from the central courts at Westminster to the local sheriffs.158 
Local courts and customs were not the king's only competition. 
Ecclesiastical courts with their canonical law, as well as the re­
emerging Roman law, played important roles in the early adminis­
tration of justice.t59 Canonical law eventually became the compet­
ing legal system to English secular law, while Roman law acted 
more as an influencing agent. Canonical law claimed jurisdiction 
over certain ecclesiastical issues (and some marginally so) with the 
rest largely left to the secular law of laymen.160 
Eventually, English secular law won out. At first, English 
courts took bits and pieces from canon law, but in the end the 
"king's justices ... [became] interested in the maintenance of a sys­
tem that is all their own."161 The justices' system would be dictated 
from within, not from abroad.162 The church too was trying to limit 
the jurisdiction of its clerics/judges by later forbidding them to sit 
over secular matters or render judgments in secular cases.163 The 
king and the church were simultaneously struggling to bring their 
respective judges under their exclusive control. 
Finally, there remained private courts and other local courts, 
152. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 72. 
153. Id. at 73. 
154. V AN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 13. 
155. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 71. 
156. Id. 
157. FLOWER, supra note 137, at 61. 
158. Id. at 70. 
159. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 111. 
160. Id. at 124-30. 
161. Id. at 135. 
162. See id. at 135. 
163. ALAN HARDING, THE LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 47-48 (1973). 
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although both slowly lost importance as time passed from the Con­
quest. Private courts would handle claims made between two indi­
viduals that had the same lord.164 The Hundred Court and other 
local courts would handle local matters, but if significant land was 
at stake, often at least one of the participants would seek the impar­
tiality of the royal courtS.165 
4. The Development of the Law 
Even though the Normans did not bring with them an estab­
lished legal code and adopted a mix-match of legal traditions in En­
gland, a more centralized form of law was needed for effective rule. 
This was accomplished through specific decrees by the king, as well 
as the continued centralization of the courts. 
Under Henry II, the first large steps were taken towards estab­
lishing early notions of a uniform common law.166 In the late 
twelfth century, Henry held a council at Clarendon where he forced 
his nobles to clarify the law of the land where there was conflict 
between canon and secular law.167 Henry also tightened the admin­
istration of justice by speaking with his justices about procedures or 
the state of laws.168 
These changes, along with the Assize of Clarendon,169 (which 
significantly changed the administration of criminal law), an investi­
gation into the practices of sheriffs in 1170, and the Assize ofNorth­
ampton in 1176 (a new set of instructions to his justices), all 
combined to strengthen the central control of justice, and its jus­
tices, by the crown.17° As was well put by Pollock and Maitland: 
If we try to sum up in a few words those results of Henry's reign 
which are to be the most durable and the most fruitful, we may 
say that the whole of English law is centralized and unified by the 
institution of a permanent court of professional judges, by the 
164. FLOWER, supra note 137, at 92. 
165. [d. at 83. 
166. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 136-37. One important point 
about "common law" is that it was not at this point just judge-made law (as we com­
monly use the term today), but rather was a way to distinguish secular law from canoni­
cal law, or royal law from local. It was a term used to differentiate between types/ 
categories of law. Eventually, judge-made vs. statutory became another one of the dis­
tinctions, and the one that holds true to this day. See supra Part LB. See also VAN 
CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 3. 
167. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 137. 
168. [d. at 136. 
169. [d. at 137. 
170. See id. at 137-38. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 18. 
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frequent mission of itinerant justices throughout the land, by the 
introduction of the 'inquest' or 'recognition' and the 'original 
writ' as normal parts of the machinery of justice.171 
As previously discussed, it is significant that each and every 
one of these "normal parts" operates as a limitation on judicial dis­
cretion. The limitations serve other important functions besides re­
straining the judiciary.l72 
Henry II's. reforms widened the reach of monarchical power 
and stripped many private parties of their traditional remedies, 
both in civil and criminal matters.n3 The king's judges and officers 
also took more control over the prosecution of serious crime174 as 
the list of criminal matters under the king's control grew.175 
During this period the first of the great English law books was 
published: A Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England com­
posed in the time ofKing Henry the Second while the honourable . .. 
Ranulf Glanvill held the helm ofjustice. 176 Although it is not clear if 
Glanvill actually wrote the book, it nevertheless became quite pop­
ular.n7 Glanvill's book acted as a reference for judges, although 
not in the precedential sense.178 Precedent and case law would 
emerge relatively soon though.179 
At Henry's passing, 
the strong central court was doing justice term after term on a 
large scale [and would continue to do so through the reign of 
King Richard]; it was beginning to have a written memory which 
would endure for all ages in the form of a magnificent series of 
judicial records.180 
171. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 38. 
172. See supra notes 135-66 and accompanying text. 
173. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICf ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 9 (1985). 
174. Sir Frederick Pollock, The King's Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 HARV. L. 
REV. 177, 178 (1900). 
175. Id. at 177-78. This does not mean that the local role ceased. In one example 
from the Curia Regis rolls of the Justice in Eyre, the sheriff seems to have been the one 
to determine the outcome of a criminal accused of the rape and robbery of a woman. 
FLOWER, supra note 137, at 57. 
176. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 163-64. 
177. Id. at 163, 166. 
178. Id. at 166. 
179. The book that would act more as a reporter of cases for precedential use was 
Bracton's great law book, compiled between 1250-1258. Unlike Glanvill before him, 
Bracton drew on precedent and provided an accurate and uniform view of English law. 
Id. at 206-07. 
180. Id. at 168-69. 
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The English legal system continued to evolve at a quickening 
pace from the thirteenth century on (and beyond the scope of this 
Article). The largest development that bears mentioning for the 
purpose of this Article is the Magna Carta.l81 It was demanded by 
the barons, granted by the King, and served as the most significant 
check on the king's justice to that point.182 The king too closely 
controlled the royal courts183 and judicial discretion was limited to 
such an extent that the barons demanded changes.l84 One signifi­
cant outcome of the Magna Carta was to place the king "below the 
law."185 The Magna Carta was the first great statute of England 
and it wrestled away some of the king's control over judges and the 
law. From that point on, judicial discretion would continue to ex­
pand in England and later, some of the Magna Carta's central 
discretionary principals would be embodied III the U.S. 
Constitution.186 
B. 	 Judicial Discretion in Medieval England between 1066 and 
1215 
Closely associated with the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition is the 
concept of judicial independence. Today, we might conceptualize 
this as freedom from constraint, or the opportunity to exercise dis­
cretion. Yet, early medieval English judges were not independent 
in the way we now think of "independence."187 Between 1066 and 
1215, justices were never truly "independent. "188 The king was 
above everyone else (at least until the Magna Carta), and the 
181. A copy of the Magna Carta translation is available through the U.S. National 
Archives and Record Administration at http;!lwww.archives.gov/exhibiChalVfea­
tured_documents/magna_cartaltranslation.html. 
182. 	 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 181. 
183. Id. at 204 Uudges on the King's Bench are "very truly the king's servants"); 
see also HARDING, supra note 163, at 38 ("scope of royal justice depended ... on the 
king's power"). 
184. 	 Daniel Brook, Happy 789th, Magna Carta, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 
10. 
185. 	 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 181-82. 
186. 	 Brook, supra note 184, at 10. 
187. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 66. At first blush this will limit the conclusions 
that might be drawn from a comparison between the current federal judiCial system and 
medieval England's. However, as will be discussed below, this does not operate as a 
significant barrier. 
188. See id. at 66-67. But see United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1338 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005) (imposing a twelve month, one day sentence 
where the Guidelines would have required a sentence range of thirty-seven to forty-siX 
months). 
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judges were clearly his subjects.189 
Martin Shapiro suggests that "most of the phenomena we 
come to call judicial independence, or see as the roots of judicial 
independence, are closely associated historically with a long-term 
English tendency toward extreme political centralization."19o The 
courts' "powers and jurisdiction, indeed their very existence, have 
been determined by the king's commission and/or parliamentary 
statute. "191 Even so, just prior to the Norman Conquest, English 
judges did occasionally exercise discretion when it came to impos­
ing penalties.192 After the Conquest, however, the Norman kings 
would understandably be involved in the administration of justice 
as a tool for ruling a foreign land.193 
There were four main structural mechanisms that acted to limit 
judicial discretion in medieval England between 1066 and 1215: (1) 
the centralization of the courts and the accompanying uniformity in 
the law; (2) the advent of the jury; (3) "appellate" review; and (4) 
jurisdictional limitations, including the specialization of courts.194 
As with the discussion of the U.S. legal system, this list is not ex­
haustive, but covers the primary structural limitations on judicial 
discretion. Additionally, there were spot-measures and specific de­
crees by the king that acted to limit discretion, such as the Assize 
discussed above.195 
1. Centralization of Courts and Uniformity in the Law 
As the Norman kings consolidated the numerous English 
courts into a smaller number of royal courts,196 two things further 
acted to limit judicial discretion. First, centralizing courts allowed 
for the transmission of the king's power through "tentacles running 
into the countryside."197 This allowed for more control by the king 
over the actual decisions. This was especially so for kings like King 
John, who was absent from England far less frequently than some 
189. [d. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 23 (describing the back­
ground and training of Henry II's justices). 
190. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 66. 
191. Id. 
192. NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE: BEFORE A.D. 
1307, at 2 (1969). 
193. See RALPH V. TURNER, THE KING AND HIS COURTS: THE ROLE OF JOHN 
AND HENRY III IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 1199-1240, at 11 (1968). 
194. See supra notes 135-66 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text. 
196. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3. 
197. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 78. 
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of the early Norman kings.198 The king's actual physical presence 
allowed for far more control over the outcome of individual cases. 
The king also maintained "his freedom to draw those cases that in­
terested him or involved him in some indirect way into his own 
court, where he could watch over them more closely."199 
Second, as litigants discovered that the king's justice was not 
only more efficient, but also supposedly less biased, many litigants 
began to pursue their cases in royal courts. This had the effect of 
limiting the number of cases under local control. Thus, the centrali­
zation allowed the king more control over his own judges' decisions 
while simultaneously structurally limiting the primary discretion of 
local judges by removing more and more types of claims or actions 
from their courts and into the hands of the king. 
The king's "tentacles" were the itinerant justices, who along 
with the central royal court sitting at Westminster, played an impor­
tant role in the centralization of power.200 Itinerant justices trav­
eled out into the countryside on temporary assignments to hear 
cases in the king's name.201 While centralizing power in the king, 
the act of bringing the itinerant justices back into the king's pres­
ence functioned to limit those justices' ability to exert any kind of 
independence or discretion-provided they wanted to remain on 
the king's good side. Henry II can be credited for refining the role 
of the itinerant justices by sending them out on regularly scheduled 
circuits, so locals would be able to count on when the king's law 
would come to town.202 Regularity allowed for further reliance by 
litigants. 
Another by-product of sending the itinerant justices was the 
diffusion of a more uniform body of English law.203 Rather than 
having a different legal custom in each village that only a well­
versed local judge might be able to decipher, slowly there emerged 
increased consistency and overall uniformity.204 However, the itin­
erant justices did not have unfettered discretion to impose the 
king's laws as they saw fit. In 1178, the King returned to England 
and heard complaints about itinerant justices enforcing the Assize 
198. TURNER, supra note 193, at 21. 
199. [d. at 35. 
200. [d. at 10-11. 
201. HARDING, supra note 163, at 32-38; TURNER, supra note 193, at 10-11. 
202. TURNER, supra note 193, at 11-14. 
203. HARDING, supra note 163, at 38. 
204. See id. 
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of Northampton with too much "zeal."205 The justices in question 
were removed and although itinerant justices were sent out again 
the following year, the message was clear: you [itinerant justice] 
are allowed some freedom, but never forget you are the king's 
servant.206 
The king's displeasure at over-enforcement of his decrees 
should be contrasted with the discretion that remained inherent in 
the system when it came to lessening sentences. For many crimes, 
justices retained the discretion to lessen the penalties or "impose a 
pecuniary penalty in lieu of more severe punishment.''207 Justices' 
exercise of discretion, when it came to lessening penalties, was de­
signed to have a specific effect. By allowing judges to lessen some 
penalties based on the facts of the case, the aim "was the mainte­
nance of good law and good order, and in relying on discretionary 
powers to avoid undue rigidity in his new rules, Henry II was fol­
lowing the traditional policy of Saxon and Danish kings.''208 This 
increased the likelihood that the Norman kings' decrees and laws 
would be followed and respected. 
Some very serious crimes, such as felonious homicide, would 
be removed to the sole province of the king, but in many cases the 
"king's justices, whether in the Curia Regis or on eyre, had author­
ity to license concords in appeals of breach of [the king's] peace."209 
Licenses for concords were like pardons, except that they were is­
sued when it looked likely that a party would prosecute an "appeal" 
to the case.210 
Homicide, the ultimate breach of the king's peace, understand­
ably became a subject matter the king took great interest in. Early 
after the Norman Conquest, some killings were considered local in 
nature and would not have been under the king's justice,211 but that 
distinction did not last long. In the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, for 
example, no distinction was made between killings that did not in­
voke the king's peace and those that did.212 Later, this would result 
in quite odd resolutions. 
For example, in 1203 a man killed five people in a "fit of mad­
205. V AN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 21. 
206. Id. 
207. HURNARD, supra note 192, at 13. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 22. 
210. Id. 
211. See id. at 8. 
212. Id. at 8-13. 
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ness."213 Then, in an obvious case of self-defense, an individual de­
termined not to become the sixth victim killed the madman.214 
Normally, the justices would have handled this case (i.e., dis­
missed), but they were required to refer it to the King.215 Hurnard 
suggests that the king's screening of homicide cases was in part due 
to a lack of trust in the justices.216 
By the late twelfth century, a person charged with homicide 
would have to appeal to the king for mercy?17 but there is signifi­
cant evidence that pardons were available for the right amount.218 
In any event, by allowing for the possibility of a pardon, the king 
was able to give more severe penalties.219 The logic was that the 
constant imposition of stiff penalties without some opportunity for 
clemency would result in unrest. Over the long-term, this would 
make it harder for the Normans to rule effectively. 
A more uniform body of law and the development of the 
"common law" also necessarily meant a move away from the mix­
ing of secular and canonical law, as each was becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable with the church's role in secular law.220 
As previously discussed, the actual rendering of laws into writ­
ing was another important factor in creating uniform English laws. 
The law books of Granvill and Bracton, while not constituting bind­
ing precedent, created a model of legal and judicial thinking. Along 
with new English law books came the increased use and writing of 
pleas and rolls. On the one hand, these developments were liberat­
ing for judges. As the common law developed, it became the prov­
ince of those schooled in it to improve it. On the other hand, a 
written record of an increasingly centralized and uniform law struc­
turally reduced the number of choices from which a judge had to 
choose. No longer could a judge pick from canonical law to reach a 
result; no longer, as the common law gained stronger roots, could a 
judge make a decision "willy-nilly." The law books provided a stan­
dard against which judicial decisions-the exercise of discretion­
were measured. 
213. Id. at 25. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 26. 
217. Id. at 8. 
218. Id. at 17. 
219. Id. at 13-14. 
220. See TURNER, supra note 193, at 40-44. 
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2. The Jury 
Although the development of the modern jury was still years 
away in the eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth centuries, its 
close cousin was emerging. From the Assize of Clarendon came the 
first significant change in the composition and role of the jury in 
England.221 The jury was, and would develop further into, a body 
by which primary judicial discretion would be limited. Like juries 
of today, these juries were concerned with factual matters, which 
reduced judicial discretion. This reduction of judicial discretion was 
not by accident, as evidenced by the conflict between secular and 
canonical law. Juries were used where there was some disagree­
ment between the two: "Church and state are at issue, and neither 
should be judge in its own cause."222 
The first jury to hear a case and decide the factual issues did 
not always have the last word, however. The jury of attaint was a 
powerful tool by which the court could reexamine the evidence or 
facts of the case. "Under the theory that the trial jury may have 
'willfully falsified' their verdict, an attaint jury was summoned to 
decide whether the first jury had perjured themselves."223 If the 
second jury decided that the first jury had perjured itself, the judge 
would impose stiff penalties on the attainted jury, such as forfeiture 
of their goods and chattels, loss of their lands to the king, ejectment 
of their wives and children from their homes, and payment of a 
fine. 224 Additionally, since the original party to the case was a party 
along with the suspect jury, the original party also had to pay a 
firie. 225 
Just the threat of an attaint meant the judge wielded a signifi­
cant amount of power in shaping the outcome of a case. While the 
writ of attaint was originally only granted by leave of the king, its 
use was later given to the discretion of the judges.226 As one com­
mentator has noted: "Fortunately, the doctrine of jury attaint is no 
longer around for judges to use to bludgeon jurors into being other 
221. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 77-78. 
222. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 144-45. 
223. Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in 
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 509-10 (1995) (quot­
ing JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 
137 (1898». 
224. Id. at 510; David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common 
Law, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 669, 686-87 (1989). 
225. Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 37 
n.44 (1994). 
226. Id. 
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than independent and impartial finders of fact."227 Even though 
juries could be attainted, the role of the jury was nevertheless struc­
turally designed to limit primary judicial discretion. 
3. Appellate Review 
Appellate review did not exist for medieval judges the way we 
conceive of it today. An "appeal" in medieval England was actually 
a charge against the judge, personally, for the decision reached in a 
case. There was no right to appeal and no formalized structure. 
Only in certain circumstances did appealing act as a mechanism for 
righting "miscarriages of justice."228 Even though the parties did 
not always have the opportunity to appeal, some county courts 
would seek advice from the royal court in Westminster if the county 
court had a particularly difficult case.229 
Given that appeal was neither a uniformly available nor a 
widely used procedure, it is better to think of those appeals that did 
occur as ad hoc limits on discretion, as opposed to structural limits 
on secondary discretion. Therefore, appeals hardly constituted the 
same kind of mechanism that would in turn affect judicial decision­
making in the way we now think of them.230 Nevertheless, appel­
late review as it existed in medieval England still remained a pri­
mary and secondary discretion-limiting mechanism. 
4. Jurisdiction as a Limitation on Discretion 
Jurisdiction was then, as it is now, a significant limitation on 
judicial discretion. In some cases the limitation was structural. As 
the court system was centralized, the king was able to divide up the 
work to different types of courts. In addition to the king's courts, 
including the itinerant justices, there were courts like the "justices 
of the Jews," which were concerned solely with the issues arising 
out of the Jewish money-lending industry.231 As Ralph Turner 
227. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall & 
Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 
F.R.D. 161, 165-66 (1988). 
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230. See, e.g., Hon. Ann Claire Williams, Speech at University of Wisconsin Law 
School (Feb. 23, 2004) (notes of speech on file with author). Speaking about her fifteen 
years as a district court judge in Chicago, Illinois, Judge Williams mentioned that when 
deciding a close case, she had an eye on whether the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
would likely reverse her decision. If reversal was likely, it affected her decision-making. 
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notes, judges also knew there were limits on which matters they 
should be deciding and which ones were best left to the king.232 
This type of behavior, while not necessarily imposed by the king, 
acted as a limitation on those judges' discretion to handle certain 
types of cases, or make certain types of rulings. 
Some of the jurisdictional limitations were not structural, but 
rather operated on an individual basis. Itinerant justices, for exam­
ple, could be given very limited-purpose appointments.233 Purpose­
based limitations acted in concert with structural limitations to sig­
nificantly restrict judicial discretion. The king could maintain strict 
control over the behavior of the justices by expanding or limiting 
the justices' jurisdiction on an individual basis. 
III. TRANSFERABLE CONCEPTS AND LESSONS 
In comparing federal judicial discretion in twenty-first century 
America with medieval England, we see that many of the mecha­
nisms that now operate to limit primary and secondary judicial dis­
cretion have their roots in the tumultuous period immediately 
following the Norman Conquest. Further, both Congress and kings 
took specific actions with the goal of limiting judicial discretion in 
reaction to events of the day. Often, these specific reactions have 
been attempts to legitimize the sovereign's authority to rule. 
Congress' reaction to the continuous challenges to the Sentenc­
ing Guidelines as manifested by the systemic downward departures, 
was to enact the Feeney Amendment. In Congress' eyes, down­
ward departures were an affront to the crime-sanctioning power of 
Congress, and therefore of the United States. Instead of looking to 
address the underlying issues (i.e., possibly faulty guidelines), Con­
gress sought to alter the level of judicial discretion to resolve the 
turmoiL Similarly, Congress reacted in a "knee-jerk" fashion when 
it changed the sentences for white-collar crimes, even though the 
committee tasked with recommending sentences did not think 
longer sentences were necessary. 
Congress limited federal judges' primary and secondary discre­
tion through specific enactments-not unlike the kings' Assizes­
and further sought to influence judicial behavior by strengthening 
its physical presence (the subpoena mechanism). This practice is 
not unlike the tactic of King John who, in his quest to centralize 
power, kept his royal court under close scrutiny out of fear and 
232. Id. at 39. 
233. Id. at 30. 
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suspicion.234 
In looking at the period following the Norman Conquest, we 
see the beginnings of structural limitations being put in place as 
kings experimented with maintaining centralized control over gov­
ernment and the administration of justice. For many of the same 
reasons, those structural limitations persist in the U.S. legal system. 
Four main structural limitations originating in medieval En­
gland between 1066 and 1215 survive. First, following the Assize of 
Clarendon, the jury began to limit the scope of judicial fact-finding. 
As a discretion-limiting mechanism, the jury persists today, al­
though admittedly in twenty-first century America this function of 
the jury is becoming increasingly less relevant. 
Second, the Norman Kings put significant jurisdictionallimita­
tions on early judges as a way of controlling them. Congress contin­
ues to impose significant jurisdictional limitations (subject matter 
and personal) on federal court judges, thereby restricting their pri­
mary discretion. 
Third, the concerted effort to move from local justice and cus­
tom to a centralized court system with a "common law" and the 
moving away from canonical law as a way of solidifying royal power 
and justice, resulted in centralized courts. In twenty-first century 
America, the federal trial courts are centralized under one Supreme 
Court and twelve courts of appeals. Via appellate review and stat­
utes, Congress continues to create a uniform body of law for those 
courts to apply in concert at the will of Congress. 
Finally, although modern notions of appellate review were spo­
radic in medieval England, appellate review has become one of the 
defining features of the American legal system. It now operates as 
a structural mechanism to limit secondary discretion. 
These structural limitations were established as a way of re­
straining the judiciary and cementing the strength and legitimacy of 
the king. Spot measures used by the king, and now Congress, (e.g., 
Assizes or the Feeney Amendment) reduce primary judicial discre­
tion. Even though U.S. federal judges have some protections 
against a complete scuttling of their discretion, spot measures and 
structural limitations act together to perform many of the same dis­
cretion-limiting functions as they did eight to ten centuries ago. 
While a measure of discretion has been restored as a result of 
234. Id. at 43-44. 
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Blakely and Booker, Congress is sure to react to limit discretion 
once again. 
The most important lesson for Congress looking forward may 
be a cautionary one, and it is hard to improve on a popular quote: 
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it."235 At the very least, "[t]hose who do not remember [the past] 
are in jeopardy of suffering at the hands of those who say they 
do."236 The U.S. Constitution sets up a unique structure that is de­
signed to ensure judicial independence. Despite the Founders' de­
sire to establish an independent judiciary, many of the same 
structural limitations on judicial discretion that existed in medieval 
England remain present in the U.S. federal system. 
The increasing number of discretion-limiting statutory enact­
ments, such as Congress' limitations in the realm of sentencing, 
make our current federal judges' discretion look more and more 
like the discretion wielded by medieval English judges. That will 
again likely be true when Congress reacts to Booker. The examina­
tion by subpoena of individual judges' sentencing decisions is not 
unlike the king bringing an itinerant justice back to Westminster to 
review the justice's actions on eyre. Likewise, when the king dis­
missed itinerant justices for over-enforcing his laws, he sent a strong 
message. Will Congress do the same by impeaching a judge who 
continues to downward-depart in the face of the Feeney 
Amendment? 
It is important to understand the historical reasons for judicial 
discretion-or the lack of it-before we start chipping away at what 
discretion U.S. federal district court judges still have, both before, 
and now after, Booker. The more judicial discretion is removed, 
the more judges will become Congress' servants. 
Before any steps are taken to replace or modify the Guide­
lines, thereby again restricting judges' sentencing discretion, it 
would be wise to understand why judges need discretion as they 
perform their valuable role in our society. Rushing to replace or 
modify the Guidelines without appreciating the possible conse.., 
quences will likely lead to disastrous results. 
Judges in medieval England were in many respects merely the 
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servants of the king, but even the Norman kings understood that 
unbending enforcement of stiff penalties was counter-productive on 
a number of fronts. Long-term enforcement without some opportu­
nity for clemency results in unrest. The possibility of a pardon gave 
the king the freedom to impose stiffer penalties and judges could 
attaint juries they thought had misapplied the facts. Congress 
seems to have forgotten these lessons. 
By taking action that further limits judicial discretion, Con­
gress runs the risk that modern judges will have little more discre­
tion than medieval English judges had. Given our Founders' desire 
to separate themselves from England when the Constitution was 
written, and by providing three separate branches of government, it 
is unlikely they wished Congress to reestablish severe limits on judi­
cial discretion. Whether mandatory federal sentencing schemes are 
reincarnated or not, we should continue to question the wisdom of 
further limiting judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Norman kings both used structural mechanisms and spe­
cific measures to limit both the primary and secondary discretion of 
judges. Many of the mechanisms that now operate to limit federal 
judges' discretion have their roots in post-Conquest England be­
tween 1066 and 1215. Specifically, the creation of uniform laws 
vested in one system of courts, the jury, the appellate process, and 
jurisdiction, all operated then, as they do now, to limit judicial 
discretion. 
We should question the wisdom of recent and future congres­
sional attempts to limit the sentencing discretion of federal judges, 
as the more judges are reined in by Congress, the more they resem­
ble the king's justices. More importantly, we should be concerned 
with a continued erosion of judicial discretion without understand­
ing its historical underpinnings. The king's justices had very limited 
discretion and were largely beholden to the king; it is difficult to 
imagine the Founders envisioning a similarly servile role for U.S. 
federal judges. 
